The Impact of Cost Changes on Industry Dynamics by James E. Prieger







University of California, Davis Department of Economics
Working Paper 05-1
February 7, 2005
1I thank seminar participants at the Berkeley/Stanford IOFEST, UC Davis, UC Irvine, the 2004 Inter-
national Industrial Organization Society conference and the 2004 North American Summer Meeting of the
Econometric Society for helpful comments.Abstract
This paper inquires into the response of industry dynamics to increases in costs. We show
that increases in marginal and ﬁxed costs may have interesting, non-obvious eﬀects on entry and
exit. Before costs change, the model exhibits behavior that matches many industries such as
manufacturing and retail: fewer but larger ﬁrms over time, and signiﬁcant amounts of entry and
exit. When costs rise, price rises and the market quantity supplied falls, but the amount of entry
and exit may rise or fall. The most intuitive outcome from a cost increase is the competitor neutral
case, in which entry decreases and exit increases. Two other possible cases are the entrant favoring
case, in which entry and exit both increase, and the incumbent favoring case, in which entry and
exit both decrease. The model places restrictions on which outcomes are possible given which costs
rise (marginal or ﬁxed). The entrant favoring case can ari s eo n l yf r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nm a r g i n a l
cost, which favors small entering ﬁrms relative to larger incumbents. The incumbent favoring case
can come about only from an increase in ﬁxed cost, which favors incumbents with their larger
market share relative to small entrants. These restrictions allow one to infer the nature of the
cost increases even when costs are not directly observed. The model can be used to examine the
impacts of cost-increasing regulation or exogenous process innovation on industry dynamics.
Keywords: marginal cost, ﬁxed cost, dynamic industry models, entry, exit, failure, market
size.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper inquires into the response of industry dynamics–namely, entry and exit–to increases in
costs. At ﬁrst glance it may appear that there is not much to explore; when the cost of production
in a market rises, one naturally expects that entry will decrease and exit increase as ﬁrms adjust
to the new cost structure. In a static model of entry it is hard to imagine any outcome other than
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms dropping as costs rise, regardless of how the model is speciﬁed.
Similarly, in many dynamic models, cost increases result in less entry and more exit. However, the
present work shows that in a dynamic setting some surprising outcomes can happen. In particular,
a cost increase may result in more entry or less exit than before. These results do not depend on
game-theoretic strategic interactions among ﬁrms, or from ﬁrms’ investment decisions, two common
features of models of industry dynamics in the industrial organization literature that can lead to
a rich set of results. Rather, in our model entry growth and exit deterrence can follow from a
relatively simple model with atomistic ﬁrms.
The present work was motivated by an empirical investigation into the eﬀects on ﬁrms of The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, the most recent major federal antidiscrimination
law. The ADA seeks to prevent employment and wage discrimination against disabled workers,
and to ensure the physical accessibility of businesses to disabled customers. Complying with the
ADA creates costs for ﬁrms, which may alter entry and exit decisions. Compliance costs stem
from provisions mandating accommodation of disabled workers and customers, and from the civil
lawsuits and penalties to which the ADA exposes ﬁrms. In Prieger (2004), we conduct an empirical
examination to determine if the social regulation had a measurable impact on the number of
ﬁrms, the entry of new ﬁrms, and the failure rates of existing ﬁrms in the retail sector. Treating
regulatory or legal changes as cost increases for ﬁrms is in accord with other empirical literature in
other settings (e.g., Baicker and Chandra (2004)), which typically assumes that the only potential
2impacts are decreased entry and increased exit.1 We ﬁnd that the ADA is associated with a decline
in the number of food stores in each market; similar results are obtained for other segments of the
retail sector. The surprising empirical ﬁnding, however, is that some variables related to ADA-
induced cost increases, such as disability-related labor complaints and court cases, are associated
with increases in entry or decreases in exit. These unintuitive empirical results led to a deeper look
into what one should expect to ﬁnd when costs rise in a dynamic setting.
In the model developed here, a variant of Klepper’s (1996) model, we show that increases
in marginal and ﬁxed costs may indeed have interesting and non-obvious eﬀects on entry and
exit. Before costs change, the model exhibits behavior that matches many industries such as
manufacturing and retail: fewer but larger ﬁrms over time and signiﬁcant amounts of entry and
exit. When costs rise, price rises and the market quantity supplied falls, but the amount of entry
and exit may rise or fall. Entry can rise or exit can fall because cost increases aﬀect diﬀerent
cohorts heterogeneously. The oldest incumbents are the largest ﬁrms and entrants are the smallest
ﬁrms in the model, and cost changes lead to composition eﬀects in the market structure. It may
happen that a few large incumbents exit and make room for a larger number of entrants, or that
so many potential ﬁrms are prevented from entering that fewer incumbents exit when cost rises.
The most intuitive outcome from a cost increase is the competitor neutral case, in which entry
decreases and exit increases. Two other possible cases are the entrant favoring case, in which entry
and exit both increase, and the incumbent favoring case, in which entry and exit both decrease. The
model places restrictions on which outcomes are possible given which costs rise (marginal or ﬁxed).
The entrant favoring case can arise only from an increase in marginal cost, which favors small
entering ﬁrms relative to larger incumbents which suﬀer greater inframarginal loss. The incumbent
favoring case can come about only from an increase in ﬁxed cost, which favors incumbents with
their larger market share relative to small entrants. These restrictions allow one to infer the nature
1In Baicker and Chandra (2004) the “ﬁr m ”i sap h y s i c i a n ,a n dt h ev a r i a t i o ni nl e g a lc l i m a t ei sp r o v i d e db yr e g i o n a l
diﬀerences in medical malpractice costs.
3of the cost increases even when costs are not directly observed. For example, if one observes that
entry and exit both increased after a cost-increasing event, such as a new regulation, then the model
implies that marginal costs must have risen. Thus hypotheses about how regulation aﬀects cost can
be tested. The same model could be used to examine the impacts of other forms of cost-increasing
regulation or exogenous process innovation on industry dynamics.
In this paper we consider the immediate, short-run impact of cost changes on entry and exit.
In contrast to the emphasis in previous literature (discussed in the next section) on steady-state
outcomes, we believe that in empirical settings what we observe is not instantaneous switching
from one steady state to another. Therefore the theory is developed to create predictions and
restrictions on how dynamics change immediately after costs change, which is merely the ﬁrst step
toward the new steady state.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the relevant literature.
Section 3 introduces the theoretical model of ﬁrm dynamics, and section 4 examines the response
to the cost changes.
2 Relation to the Literature on Entry and Exit
Interest in the entry and exit of ﬁrms has lead to a rich literature in industrial organization. Here
we discuss the implications of cost changes in existing models in order to highlight how our results
diﬀer. In simple models, when costs rise, entry typically falls and exit increases. Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990) provide a straightforward static entry model that illustrates the typical ﬁndings. By
assuming that demand is proportional to the size of the market, Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) can





where i indexes the number of entrants, j is the marginal entrant, F is ﬁxed cost, Pi is the price
when there are i ﬁrms, c is marginal cost, and q is demand per consumer. Clearly increases in ﬁxed
4or marginal cost increase the size of the market needed to support a given number of entrants, which
implies that the number of entrants decreases as costs rise. Regarding exit, consider Ghemawat
and Nalebuﬀ’s (1985) declining industry game, in which two ﬁrms with capacity Ki have marginal
costs of c (there are no ﬁxed costs in the model). Firms produce at full capacity, and inverse
demand as a function of total output and time is P(K1 + K2,t),w i t h∂P/∂t < 0.T h e o p t i m a l
time t∗
i for ﬁrm i to exit is deﬁned by P(K,t∗
i)=c,w h e r eK = K1 + K2 if the ﬁrm is the ﬁrst
to exit and Ki otherwise. To ﬁnd the eﬀect of an increase in marginal cost, totally diﬀerentiate to
yield (∂P/∂t)dt∗
i = dc, whence it follows that dt∗
i/dc < 0. Thus when costs increase, exit increases
in the short run (in the sense that exit is brought closer to the present in time).
Most simple models provide similar results from exogenous changes in cost. However, it is
important to distinguish between exogenous cost shifts and costs that are under the control of the
ﬁrms. For example, in the canonical entry deterrence games (e.g., Dixit (1980)) incumbents can
invest to lower marginal cost in the future, which may deter entry by rivals. Thus in a cross-section
of markets where such games are being played, lower marginal costs may be correlated with less
entry. In this paper we model the impact of changes in regulation or law that aﬀect a ﬁrm’s costs,
and thus focus exclusively on the case of exogenous cost shocks.
There are several theoretical studies of industry dynamics. Three prominent models with atom-
istic ﬁrms are Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Klepper (1996).2 Hopenhayn (1992) is the
only one of these studies that investigates the eﬀect of cost changes on entry and exit, and focuses
on the limiting distribution instead of the short-run impact we consider. Hopenhayn (1992) ﬁnds
that as entry costs rise, entry and exit both decrease (the incumbent favoring outcome, in our
nomenclature). However, this is not a surprising outcome, given that entry costs are not paid by
incumbents. In our model described in the next section, there are no entrant-speciﬁc costs and ﬁxed
costs are paid by all ﬁrms each period. When the ﬁxed cost analogous to ours rises in Hopenhayn’s
2Petrakis and Roy (1999) and Roy and Kamihigashi (2004) also explore models of industry dynamics with atomistic
ﬁrms.
5(1992) model, exit increases in the steady state and incumbent favoring is not possible as it is in
our model. The model in section 3 is based on Klepper (1996),3 who did not focus on exogenous
cost shocks. Our theoretical model simpliﬁes Klepper (1996) by abstracting away from endogenous
innovation for the sake of more readily exploring how cost changes aﬀect entry and exit. The model
we adopt is more convenient to work with than the complex dynamical system in Jovanovic (1982)
and admits non-steady state analysis more easily than does the model in Hopenhayn (1992).
Ericson and Pakes (1995) extend the literature on industry dynamics to allow imperfect com-
petition, with extensions and variants of dynamic models with strategic interactions among ﬁrms
provided by Peretto (1996), Amir and Lambson (2003), and Benkard (2004). By not adopting a
game-theoretic model, we are able to more easily characterize how entry and exit change in re-
sponse to structural cost changes. Furthermore, that we ﬁnd a rich set of possible outcomes in our
model even without incorporating strategic interactions highlights that the unexpected outcomes
do not depend on imperfect competition. However, the assumption of atomistic ﬁrms makes our
model less suited to study of industries with few ﬁrms such as telecommunications or automobile
manufacturing. We note that models of imperfect but symmetric competition such as Amir and
Lambson (2003) cannot lead to the “unexpected” outcomes we ﬁnd in our model, because the less-
obvious outcomes depend heavily on composition eﬀects (such as large incumbents being replaced
by smaller entrants).4 Furthermore, models such as that of Ericson and Pakes (1995) typically
focus on steady-state solutions due to the complexity of the non-steady-state dynamics, and we are
also interested in the transient response of industry to cost shocks.
Other studies model entry and exit in dynamic models with imperfectly competitive markets
but without strategic interactions among ﬁrms. Asplund and Nocke (2003) construct a model to
reﬂect the stylized fact from empirical studies that entry and exit rates are positively correlated
3See also Klepper (2002).
4Note however that in models with endogenous cost-reducing R&D many outcomes are possible even when com-
petition is symmetric. For example, in Peretto (1996) there are a multiplicity of equilibria, and when exogenous ﬁxed
cost rises it is possible that the number of ﬁrms rises in some equilbria while falling in others.
6across industries. In accord with their goal, they ﬁnd that when ﬁxed costs rise, entry and exit rates
decrease (the incumbent favoring outcome). Our model shows that even in a simpler model with
atomistic ﬁrms the incumbent favoring outcome is possible but is not the only potential outcome.
Some of the recent international trade literature uses models in this vein as well. One such paper
that performs comparative statics with respect to (trade) regulation-induced cost changes is Melitz
(2003), who assumes monopolistic competition among ﬁrms. Melitz (2003) shows that when trade
reform lowers the variable cost of trade or the ﬁxed cost of entry in export markets, the least
productive ﬁrms exit the domestic market and the most productive ﬁrms enter the export markets.
These composition eﬀects are akin to some of our results, although our results are all in the context
of a single market and do not rely on reallocation of ﬁrms between markets.
In addition to the theoretical studies, there are several empirical studies of entry using structural
econometric models, mostly in static or two-period settings (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1987; Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1990; Berry, 1992; Mazzeo, 2002; Seim, 2004). Given the static nature of these models,
the impact of cost changes on entry and exit can not be separated from the impact on the number
of ﬁrms in the market. Although Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2004) present a fully dynamic
structural econometric model, their focus is quite diﬀerent than the present work. Pakes et al.
(2004) incorporate strategic interactions and asymmetric information among ﬁrms, and are more
concerned with developing a suitable econometric model than in comparative statics or dynamics.
Among the numerous reduced-form empirical studies of industry dynamics (see Caves (1998) for
a survey), of most interest here may be Manjón-Antolin (2004), which emphasizes the importance
of ﬁrm size in the determination of entry and exit rates, which is related to the importance of
composition eﬀects that drive the results of our model.
73 The Model
Here we construct a model to investigate the response of industry dynamics to increases in costs. In
each period t =1 ,2,..., there is a continuum of atomistic potential entrant ﬁrms indexed by their
ﬁxed cost F ∈ [F, ¯ F] ≡ F,0 <F< ¯ F.T h eﬁxed costs are paid each period, and are avoidable if a
ﬁrm decides to exit (or not enter) the market. The ﬁxed costs may represent the costs of business
licenses, complying with local regulations, or lumpy investments that fully depreciate each period.
The mass of ﬁrms with ﬁx e dc o s tl e s st h a no re q u a lt oF is µ(F), where measure µ is a non-negative
monotonically increasing, diﬀerentiable, and bounded function on F. To simplify dynamics it is
assumed that there is a mass point of most-eﬃcient ﬁrms: µ(F) > 0. Firms have no costs if they
do not enter: outside opportunities are normalized to zero. The ﬁrms have constant returns to
scale technology resulting in constant marginal cost c.
Changes in regulation or business law, or adverse technology shocks can unexpectedly increase
the ﬁrm’s marginal or ﬁxed costs. Changes in marginal cost increase c directly; changes in ﬁxed
cost increase F by φ ≥ 0. A concrete example, explored in a companion paper (Prieger, 2004), is
the impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on ﬁrm’s cost. As a form of social regulation,
the ADA requires ﬁrms to alter their actions, compelling them to hire, accommodate, or make
their premises accessible to the disabled. Assuming the ﬁrms were proﬁt-maximizing before the
regulation, the ADA can be modeled at the most basic level as a cost increase for ﬁrms.
Firm i entering in period k has output in period t ≥ k denoted q(i)k
t (or q(i)t; cohort superscripts







tdµ,w h e r eFk
t is the subset of F containing the cohort of ﬁrms that entered in
period k that are still in the market at time t.C o n s u m e r sv i e wﬁrms’ products as homogeneous.
Market demand at time t, ft(p), is a function of the current market price only, where ft is continuous
and downward-sloping in price, and increases (for given p)o v e rt i m e .I faﬁrm stays in the market it
keeps all previous customers and attracts a share of new buyers (and those whose previous supplier
8exited) in proportion to last period’s “market share” st−1 ≡ q(i)t−1/Qt−1.5 This advantage of
incumbency may be due to consumer inertia, or to stocks of advertising or brand-recognition
“goodwill” not explicitly modeled. The ﬁrm can also sell more product in amount ∆q(i)t by
incurring marketing cost m(∆q),w h e r em(0) = m0(0) = 0, m0(∆q) > 0,m 00(∆q) > 0 for all
∆q ≥ 0,w i t hm0 unbounded above. Thus ﬁrm i at time t sells
q(i)t = st−1Qt + ∆q(i)t (1)
where the ﬁrst term is zero for entrants, who have no previous production. It will be shown below
that price declines and Qt increases over time in equilibrium, and therefore q(i)t increases over
time for any ﬁrm staying in the market. Many of the propositions in the paper rely on the fact
that the oldest incumbents produce the most output; the model is not suited to industries in which
large-scale entry is seen, where entrants leap-frog past incumbents.
A ﬁrm’s proﬁta tt is:
π(i)t = q(i)t (pt − c) − m(∆q(i)t) − φ − F (2)
where before any costs change φ is zero. Firms are atomistic price takers. Following Klepper
(1996), ﬁrms can project the current period’s market-clearing price, but are myopic in that they
base entry, exit, and production decisions only on current period’s proﬁts (2). Furthermore, ﬁrms
do not anticipate the cost change. Given an expectation of the market-clearing price, each ﬁrm
decides by how much to expand output by choosing the optimal ∆q(i)∗
t should the ﬁrm decide to
be in the market. Given ∆q(i)∗
t,i fπ(i)∗
t > 0 a ﬁrm decides to stay in the market, if an incumbent,
or to enter, if not where π(i)∗
t is the maximized proﬁt given expected price pt.F i r m sw i l ln o te n t e r
(or will exit) if π(i)∗
t < 0, and are indiﬀerent if π(i)∗
t =0 ,
The equilibrium price p∗




the equilibrium market supply under the optimal entry, exit, and output expansion decisions.6 It
5With a continuum of ﬁrms, the actual market share of a single ﬁrm is zero. The important things about the
quantity q(i)t−1/Qt−1 is that it is well-deﬁned and that it integrates to one under measure µ.
6Since µ is diﬀerentiable, it is continuous, and an equilibrium price exists. If µ is discontinuous (for example,
9is assumed that f1 is large enough and costs are small enough so that p∗
1 exists. A ﬁnal assumption
of the model, to simplify the dynamics, is:
Assumption 1 π(i)∗
t is increasing in pt in an interval around p∗
t−1,w i t hp∗
t lying within this
interval.
To maximize proﬁt, a ﬁrm staying in the market chooses the optimal increase in output in
accordance with the ﬁrst-order condition resulting from maximization of (2),
m0(∆q(i)∗
t)=( pt − c) (3)
which implicitly deﬁnes ∆q(i)∗
t. The assumptions on m assure that ∆q(i)∗
t > 0 whenever price is
above marginal cost, as it must be in equilibrium. A description of the equilibrium in this model,
in the absence of any cost change, is in the following proposition. Most of the results and many of
the proofs for Proposition 1 are similar to those in Klepper (1996) and are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Basic Results) Let V (i)t = q(i)t (pt − c) − m(∆q(i)t) be variable proﬁt( e x c l u -
sive of ﬁxed cost φ and F), and asterisks denote optimal quantities and sets. Holding c and φ ﬁxed,
an equilibrium price sequence {p∗










t−1 ∀i ∈ Fk∗
t ,t,k≤ t. Firms grow over time or exit.
3. ∆q(i)k∗
t = ∆q∗
t ∀ i ∈ Fk∗




t and V (i)k∗
t = V k∗
t ∀ i ∈ Fk∗
t ,t,k≤ t. Output and variable proﬁts are the same
for all ﬁrms of the same cohort in the market in period t.
because of discrete ﬁrms), excess demand may not equal zero in equilibrium because a marginal increase in price may
ﬂi pt h em a r k e tf r o me x c e s sd e m a n dt oe x c e s ss u p p l yu p o ne n t r yo fas i n g l eﬁrm.
105. There exists an Fk
t such that Fk∗
t =[ F,Fk
t ] ∀t,k ≤ t.F o rﬁrms of a cohort, only those with





s ,a n dFt
t <F s
s for t>s . The output, variable proﬁt, and threshold
ﬁxed cost of entrants fall over time.
7. Exit occurs each period.
8. Entry decreases each period, and eventually ceases in ﬁnite time.
9. The number of ﬁrms in the market may increase at ﬁrst, but eventually declines monotoni-
cally.7




to µ.” Regarding Proposition 1.8, the measure of entering ﬁr m sd e c l i n e st oz e r oa st →∞in all
cases. If ﬁrms with the minimum ﬁxed cost have non-zero measure, then there is a date t after
which no more ﬁrms enter (see the appendix).
The model exhibits behavior that matches many industries (manufacturing and retail, for ex-
ample): fewer but larger ﬁrms over time, with signiﬁcant amounts of entry and exit.8 The most
eﬃcient ﬁrms (those with the lowest ﬁxed cost) remain in the market and expand their share, at
the expense of higher-cost ﬁrms that are forced to exit. Industry dynamics for a typical set of
parameter values are depicted in Figure 1 for the initial 10 periods.9 The number of ﬁrms in the
top panel declines over time, in accord with Proposition 1.9. In this example the number of ﬁrms
begin to decline immediately, although Proposition 1.9 allows the possibility that the industry can
grow at ﬁrst if demand increases enough. The other panels of Figure 1 decompose the ﬁrm count




t with respect to µ.”
8Proposition 1.8 may require additional explanation. The measure of entering ﬁr m sd e c l i n e st oz e r oa st →∞
in all cases. The second part of Prop. 1.8 means that if ﬁrms with the minimum ﬁxed cost have non-zero measure,
then there is a date t after which no more ﬁrms enter. The proof in the appendix makes clear the distinction.
9In this and following ﬁgures, demand is Qt =1 0 0 0 t − p, adjustment cost is m(∆q) = 100(∆q)
3, F is distributed
uniformly on [0.01,10.0], the measure of potential entrants each period is 10,000, and c =1 .
11into its determinants, entry and exit. Entry ceases entirely in period 13 (not shown in the ﬁgure),
as suggested by Proposition 1.8.
4 The Impact of Cost Changes
With the basic behavior of industry dynamics in the model established, we can now examine the
impact of an unanticipated increase in cost. In the period cost increases, it is assumed that the
ﬁrms know that costs have changed before they make their entry, exit, and output decisions.
Proposition 2 (Impact of Cost Increases) In the period t in which cost increases, the follow-
ing hold, compared to the same period were cost not to increase:
1. p∗
t rises and Q∗
t falls.
2 .T h en u m b e ro fe n t e r i n gﬁrms can increase or decrease.
3 .T h en u m b e ro fi n c u m b e n tﬁrms can increase or decrease.
The ﬁrst point follows naturally from the fact that while cost rises for all ﬁrms, the demand
function is unchanged (see appendix for proof). The second and third results may be shown
numerically. In these statements “number of ﬁrms” is to be read as “the measure of Fk
t with
respect to µ” for the relevant Fk
t . Numerical examples showing that entry and exit can each
move in either direction are shown in Figures 2—5, which are discussed below. Given that market
quantity falls, when the number of ﬁrms increases it must be that each ﬁrm produces less or smaller
entrants replace larger incumbents (a composition eﬀect),10 or both. If enough new ﬁrms enter,
as may happen if µ has a large mass of entrants close to the threshold entry level before the cost
change, then the number of ﬁrms in the market can even rise. In static models such as Bresnahan
and Reiss (1987), in which there is no distinction between entrants and incumbents, the number
of ﬁrms can only decrease when costs rise.
10Entrants always produce less than do incumbents, by Propositions 1.2 and 1.6.
12Thus, this relatively simple model generates interesting, varied, and non-obvious responses to
the cost changes. The possibilities for entry and exit are listed in Table 1. The most intuitive case
is the competitor neutral case, in which entry decreases and exit increases in response to the cost
changes. When entry increases, it can be shown that the scale of entry ∆qt also increases (Lemmas
5 and 6 in the appendix). Thus, since market quantity in total falls, entry can increase only at the
expense of the number of incumbents, the quantity each incumbent produces, or both. Industry
dynamics for an example of the competitor neutral case resulting from an increase in ﬁxed cost is
depicted in Figure 2.11 In the example shown in the ﬁgure entry drops immediately to zero when
cost increases, although in general this need not be the case.
When entry declines and the resulting lessening of competitive pressure allows more incumbents
to stay in the market, so that exit also declines, we have the incumbent favoring case. Industry
dynamics for an example of the incumbent favoring case resulting from an increase in ﬁxed cost is
depicted in Figure 3.12
Finally, we term the case in which entry increases and the number of incumbents falls entrant
favoring. An entrant favoring case resulting from an increase in marginal cost is depicted in Figure
4.13 The bottom two panels show that both entry and exit jump up in the period of the cost change.
However, note that all changes in Table 1 are with reference to the same period in the baseline in
which no costs changes, not with reference to changes in entry and exit over time. To illustrate the
distinction, Figure 5 shows another entrant favoring case.14 U n l i k et h ec a s ei nF i g u r e4 ,e n t r ya n d
exit are lower in the period of the cost change (period 4) than the previous period. The relevant
comparison, however, is to what entry and exit would have been in period 4 had costs remained
unchanged. The implication for empirical application of the model is that a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach (or other methods that control for secular trends) may be more appropriate to determine
11In this example ﬁxed cost increases by 1.0 in period 4.
12In this example ﬁxed cost increases by 0.41 in period 2.
13In this example marginal cost increases by 2000 in period 2. A large increase is required to separate the curves
clearly in the ﬁgure.
14In this example marginal cost increases by 1300 in period 2.
13which of the cases in Table 1 applies than a simpler before-and-after model. The latter approach
applied to the data in Figure 5 would mistakenly classify this case as incumbent favoring.15
Examining when the various cases occur allows us to link more easily observed outcomes such
as entry and exit with the less easily observed changes in cost. To simplify analysis we introduce
two additional assumptions.
Assumption 2 Fixed cost F is uniformly distributed on F.
Assumption 3 At the equilibrium price ε∗
t(p∗
t −c)/p∗
t < 1,w h e r eεt ≡− f0
t(pt)pt/Qt, the elasticity
of demand.
Assumption 2 simpliﬁes comparison across cohorts of the eﬀects of the cost increase, as will
be described below.16 Assumption 3 is related to but stronger than Assumption 1. In particular,







Lemma 7 in the appendix). The last term on the right side shrinks over time, and in simulations
Assumption 3 is typically satisﬁed after a few periods, if not immediately, as the relative markup
shrinks. If demand is inelastic then Assumption 3 holds in all periods. With these assumptions,
we can characterize the impacts that the changes in cost have on entry and exit.
Proposition 3 (Restrictions on Observed Outcomes) Using the deﬁnitions from Table 1,
the following hold:
1. When marginal cost increases, the incumbent favoring case is not possible.
2. When ﬁxed cost increases, under Assumptions 2 and 3 the entrant favoring case is not possible.
15To complete the set of logical possibilities we should include the case in which entry increases, exit decreases, and
the number of ﬁrms increases. We ignore this case. It cannot happen when ﬁxed cost rises (the proof of Proposition
3.2 shows that entry must decrease). We have not been able to rule it out theoretically when marginal cost rises:
it may be possible that a small number of large incumbents exits to make room for a larger number of smaller
incumbents. However, we cannot generate it numerically.
16Technically, Assumption 2 violates the maintained assumption that µ has a mass point at F.H o w e v e r ,t h em a s s
point is needed only to simplify the proof of Propositions 1.8-9. Also, Assumption 2 can be changed to include the
mass point at F and no results would change.
14The proof of the theorem is in the appendix, but the insight is presented here. For any cohort
k, the change in the number of ﬁrms in the market Nk∗
















where b = c or φ, and the second equality follows from Proposition 1.5 and the application of
Leibnitz’ rule to a Reimann-Stieltjes integral. The marginal entrant (when k = t)o re x i t i n gﬁrm
(when k<t )i nac o h o r ts a t i s ﬁes π(Fk
t )∗
t =0 ,t h u sd e ﬁning Fk
t as the break-even level of ﬁxed
cost:
Fk
t = V k∗
t − φ (5)
where V is as deﬁned in Proposition 1.4. Expression (4) for the change in the number of ﬁrms
can then be interpreted as the change in the threshold Fk
t weighted by the density of ﬁrms at that
point, µ0(Fk
t ). Substituting (5) for Fk
































for marginal cost and ﬁxed cost changes, respectively. Under Assumption 2, µ0(Fk
t ) in (6)—(7)
is the same for all k,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes cross-cohort comparison. The second term in the brackets
(−qk
t or −1) is the direct eﬀect of the cost change on the number of ﬁr m s . T h en e g a t i v ed i r e c t
eﬀect reﬂects that because production is more expensive when costs rise, the threshold ﬁxed cost
decreases and fewer ﬁrms remain in the market (or enter). The ﬁrst term in the brackets in (6)—(7)
is the (positive) price eﬀect of the cost change. The cost increase leads to an increase in equilibrium
price (from Proposition 2.1), which increases proﬁt (because of Assumption 1). With higher proﬁt,
more ﬁrms remain in the market (or enter). The direct and price eﬀe c t st h u sm o v ei no p p o s i t e
directions, and either can predominate, leading to various cases to consider.
15Figures 6—9 depict the magnitudes of the direct and price eﬀects for various possible cases. To
























By the envelope theorem, there are no eﬀects through changes in the optimized ∆q∗
t.F o r t h e
cohort entering at t,t h eﬁrst term on the rightmost side of (8) is zero because entrants have
no pre-existing share. Consider increases in marginal cost for the moment. The sign of (6) for
entrants is determined by qk∗
t (dp∗
t/dc − 1).I fdp∗
t/dc, the equilibrium pass-through of a marginal
cost increase, is less than one, then we have the case shown in Figure 6. Here the direct eﬀect
dominates the price eﬀect at cohort age zero and entry declines. Note the intercepts are marked
using the fact that for entrants, qt
t = ∆qt
t. For older cohorts, both eﬀects are larger because qk∗
t
rises with cohort age t − k (an implication of Propositions 1.2 and 1.6).17 However, the diﬀerence
between the direct and price eﬀects grows over time, due to the increasing share sk
t−1 in (8) as
cohorts age.18 Thus the price eﬀect curve never crosses the direct eﬀect curve, the bracketed term
in equation (6) is negative, cohort size falls for each k, entry declines and exit increases, and we
have the competitive neutral case.
The argument above began with the assumption that a marginal cost increase results in less
than full pass through to consumers. However, the opposite is also possible in this model: it may be
that dp∗
t/dc > 1. When so, the direct and price eﬀects are as in Figure 7. The price eﬀect is smaller
than the magnitude of the direct eﬀect for at least the entering cohort on the left of the graph,
implying that entry increases. Given the shape of t h ec u r v e sa n dt h ef a c tt h a te x i ti n c r e a s e sf o ra t
least the oldest cohort (proved in the appendix), it must be that the curves cross. This results in
the entrant favoring case. In the entrant favoring case an increase in marginal cost hurts the proﬁt
of incumbents more than of entrants because existing ﬁrms have a larger automatic market share,
17If Assumption 2 is abandoned, then large diﬀerences in µ
0(F
k
t ) across k may aﬀect the slopes of the curves in
Figures 6—9.
18That share rises (conditional on not exiting) as a cohort ages follows from parts 2 and 6 of Proposition 1.
16and thus suﬀer greater inframarginal loss. The greater exit of incumbents results in a price that
exceeds the marginal cost increase, spurring entry by new ﬁrms. Finally, note that Proposition 3.1
follows from the discussion above: either cohort size falls for each k or the entrant favoring case
obtains, and so the incumbent favoring case is not possible when marginal cost rises.
When ﬁxed cost rises and Assumption 3 holds (e.g., when demand is inelastic), then if the
number of ﬁrms rises for a cohort j it must rise for all older cohorts as well (i.e., those with k<j ).
Thus entrant favoring is not possible (Proposition 3.2). The intuition for why entrant favoring is
impossible is that when ﬁxed cost rises, market quantity falls (Proposition 2.1) but the scale of
entry increases (Lemma 5 in the appendix). Thus the number of entrants must decrease.
When ﬁxed cost rises, competitor neutrality and incumbent favoring are both possible and are
shown in Figures 8 and 9. The direct eﬀect is always −1, because an increase in φ directly shifts
the threshold ﬁxed cost down one for one. It is shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2 that the
price eﬀect for entrants (cohort age = 0 on the graphs) is always smaller than the direct eﬀect
when Assumption 3 holds, but then rises for older cohorts. If the direct eﬀect is always larger
than the price eﬀect, as in Figure 8, then entry decreases, exit increases for all cohorts, and the
competitor neutral case results. However, it can happen that the price eﬀect dominates the direct
eﬀect for older cohorts, as in Figure 9. If exit decreases enough from these oldest cohorts, then
the incumbent favoring case can result. In this case the increase in cost disproportionately hurts
the small ﬁrms (including entrants), because their smaller scale leaves them more vulnerable to
increases in ﬁxed costs.19
Proposition 3 provides two implications from the model useful for empirical work. These are
stated as a corollary, which follows directly from Proposition 3:
Corollary 4 The following hold:
19If Assumption 3 does not hold (for which elastic demand is necessary but not suﬃcient), however, then the price
eﬀect would slope down in the ﬁgures. As a result, if the number of ﬁrms rises for a particular cohort it would also
rise for all younger cohorts, and incumbent favoring is not possible.
171. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the entrant favoring case can arise only from increases in mar-
ginal cost.
2. The incumbent favoring case can arise only from increases in ﬁxed cost.
The competitor-neutral outcome implies no restrictions on the nature of the cost increase, and
in that sense is the least informative outcome. In the empirical companion paper (Prieger, 2004),
we use these implications of the model to infer which elements of the ADA raised which costs.
For example, we ﬁnd that labor complaints about disability accommodation ﬁled with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission lead to entrant favoring impacts, and therefore must raise
the marginal costs of retail stores. On the other hand, the number of disabled individuals in the
area and accessibility lawsuits ﬁled under Title III of the ADA lead to incumbent favoring outcomes.
This suggests that ﬁxed costs rose from these sources, which implies that accessibility suit costs
are not proportional to output. Non-proportionality is consistent with the observed phenomenon
of activists ﬁling numerous ADA accessibility suits, without regard to ﬁrm size.20
The extension of the results to cost decreases instead of increases is immediate. The results
of Proposition 2.1 would be reversed and the rest of the proposition unchanged. The changes in
cohort size from equations (6)—(7) would be reversed. Proposition 3 would therefore be altered to
s t a t et h a tw h e nc decreases, the entrant favoring case is not possible, and when φ decreases, the
incumbent favoring case is not possible.
Given our interest in immediate and short-term responses to regulatory changes, we have not
discussed what the impacts are in the long run. T h em o d e lh a sl i t t l et os a ya b o u te n t r yi nt h e
long run, because entry eventually ceases in all cases (Proposition 1.8). Based on the numerical
explorations of the model (some of which are depicted in Figures 2—5), the long run eﬀects of the
cost increases on exit also appear to be minimal, because much of the adjustment to the shock
20Examples include Jarek Molski, a paraplegic who has ﬁled close to 500 lawsuits since 2001
in Southern California, and George Louie, a wheelchair activist who has ﬁled about 1,000 law-
suits since 1998 in Northern California (San Diego Union-Tribune web site, Sept. 12, 2004
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040912/news_1n12litigant.html>).
18occurs within a few periods.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have shown that increases in marginal and ﬁxed costs may have interesting and
non-obvious eﬀects on entry and exit. The intuition suggested from static models of entry, that the
number of entrants (i.e., ﬁrms in the market) must fall when costs rise, turns out to be only one of
three possible cases. In addition to the “obvious” case in which entry declines and exit increases, it
may also happen that entrants or incumbents as a group are relatively favored by the cost increase.
The restrictions placed by the model on the conditions under which the various outcomes occur
have practical implications for empirical work. For example, a particular regulation may have
placed substantial costs on ﬁrms even if the number of ﬁrms in the market does not change much,
because the aggregate may mask large compositional changes across cohorts. These implications
are exploited in the empirical companion paper to the present work, an investigation into the
impact of the ADA on the retail industry.
A remarkable aspect of our results is that a relatively simple model, with price-taking ﬁrms,
generates such a rich set of possibilities. There are no strategic interactions among ﬁrms and no
investment in the model. While leaving out game theory and investment simpliﬁes the analysis,
it also may limit application of the model to many of the commonly studied industries in the
industrial organization literature, such as telecommunications services or heavy manufacturing, in
which there are a small number of dominant ﬁrms and investment is a key feature of the industry.
A potential avenue of future research is thus to add investment or non-atomistic ﬁrms to the model.
Given the important role of ﬁxed cost in generating incumbent favoring outcomes, it may be that
ﬁrms have less incentive to reduce such costs through investment than previous static models have
suggested.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Existence of a market clearing price p∗
t proceeds by induction. Assume p∗
t−1 exists. Assumption 1
implies that if pt is low enough, no ﬁrm will be able to stay in the market. At such a price demand
exceeds supply. At pt = p∗
t−1, supply exceeds demand. To see this, note that the equilibrium
condition can be written ft(pt)=
R
s(i)t−1Qt +∆q(i)tdµ, where integration is over the set of ﬁxed








∆q(i)tdµ.I f pt = p∗
t−1,





∆q(i)tdµ > 0, and supply exceeds demand. Because ft and ∆q∗
t are
continuous in pt, there must be a price p∗
t <p ∗
t−1 that clears the market. Since it is assumed that
p∗
1 exists, an equilibrium price path {p∗
t} exists by induction.
P r o o fo fP r o p .1 . 1 . Because p∗
t <p ∗
t−1, it follows that Q∗
t >Q ∗
t−1.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 1 . 2 . By equation (3) and discussion following, ∆q(i)k
t > 0 if ﬁrm i stays in
the market. The previous proof showed that i’ sm a r k e ts h a r ea n dt h em a r k e tq u a n t i t yt ow h i c hi t
is applied both increase. Thus q(i)k∗
t >q (i)k∗
t−1.
P r o o fo fP r o p .1 . 3 . From (3) it is clear that ∆q depends only on pt, and so is the same each
period for all ﬁrms remaining in the market. Thus ∆q need not be indexed by i or k.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 1 . 4 . From Prop. 1.3 all entrants at k produce the same amount in their
ﬁrst period and therefore have the same share. For t = k +1 , from (1) it is seen that because last
period’s share and this period’s ∆qk
t are the same for all ﬁrms in cohort k, output must be identical
22as well. Continuing the argument as time goes on proves that q(i)k∗
t = qk∗
t for all t ≥ k.S i n c eq
and p are the same for all ﬁrms in the cohort (ﬁrms diﬀer only by ﬁxed cost), V i st h es a m ea s
well.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 1 . 5 .F i r m sr e m a i ni nt h em a r k e ti fπ(i)k
t = V k
t − F ≥ 0.T h i s d e ﬁnes the
marginal ﬁrm as the one with ﬁxed cost Fk
t = V k
t .F i r m sw i t hF below Fk
t remain in the market
and others exit.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 1 . 6 . From (3) and the assumption that m00 > 0 it is clear that as p∗
t falls
over time (by Prop. 1.1) so does the scale of entry and output expansion ∆q∗
t.I ft h es c a l eo fe n t r y
and p∗
t both fall over time, then it must be that V t∗
t falls over time, too. Since V t∗
t deﬁnes Ft
t (see
p r o o fo fP r o p .1 . 5 ) ,Ft
t also falls over time.
P r o o fo fP r o p .1 . 7 .By Prop. 1.2 each ﬁrm remaining in the market increases its share each
period. Without the exit of some ﬁrms this cannot happen.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 1 . 8 .Because Ft
t falls over time, then because µ is monotonic the measure
of entrants µ(Ft
t) falls over time. To show that entry eventually ceases, which is to say that there
exists a t<∞ such that no entry occurs after period t, ﬁrst let µ(F)=ˆ µ, which is non-zero by
assumption. Then, as long as V t
t >F ,w eh a v eµ(Ft
t) ≥ ˆ µ ∀ t (if V t
t = F and the lowest-cost
ﬁrms are indiﬀerent to entering, then because p falls in no future period will there be entry). Since
the proﬁt of an incumbent is higher than that of an entrant with the same F, it follows that if
a non-zero measure of ﬁrms with F = F enter each period then no incumbent with F = F ever
exits. Furthermore, the market shares of these incumbents grows in every period (Prop. 1.2).
This cannot continue ad inﬁnitum, however, because eventually the total market shares of the non-
exiting incumbents and the entrants will account for the whole market, and further share growth
will not be possible with some of them exiting. Without assuming a mass point at F, one can only
show that entry ceases in the limit (i.e., that limt→∞ µ(Ft
t)=0 )
Proof of Prop. 1.9. Because there is exit each period (Prop. 1.7) and entry eventually ceases
(Prop. 1.8), the proposition follows directly.
23A.2 Proof of Proposition 2


















































where asterisks are left out of the notation. The ﬁrst term in each set of parentheses is the
supply change coming from the marginal ﬁrms, and the second term is the supply change from the




































The numerator is negative, because ∂Fk
t /∂c = ∂V k
t /∂c from (5), which is ∂[qk
t (pt − c)−m(∆qt)]/∂c =
−qk
t < 0 by the envelope theorem, qk
t and µ0 are positive, and ∂qk






∂∆qt/∂c = −m00(∆qt)−1 < 0 by assumption. The last equality follows from diﬀerentiating (3) with






F dµ, and using
the facts that ∂Fk
t /∂p = ∂V k
t /∂p = qk
t + sk
t−1Q0
t(pt − c) and ∂qk
t /∂p = sk
t−1Q0
t + m00(∆qt)−1,t h e


















































t−1,s i n c eQ0
t < 0 (demand slopes down). If no incumbents exit,
then the right side, per-ﬁrm market shares last period weighted by number of ﬁrms in each cohort,
would sum to 1. Since some incumbents exit by Prop. 1.7, the sum is indeed less than 1. Thus
D<0 and dp/dc > 0.
24Now consider a change in ﬁxed cost. Total diﬀerentiation of (9) yields an expression similar to
(11) with φ replacing c wherever it appears. The numerator is negative, because ∂Fk
t /∂φ = −1
from (5) and ∂qk
t /∂φ =0(changes in ﬁxed cost aﬀect marginal but not inframarginal ﬁrms’ supply
decisions). The denominator is again (12), which is negative, and thus dp/dφ > 0.S i n c ep∗
t rises
in both cases, Q∗
t falls because demand slopes down.
Proofs of Props. 2.2—3. These are shown numerically; refer to the industry dynamics ﬁgures.
Figure 3 shows that the number of entering ﬁrms can decrease and the number of incumbents can
increase, while Figure 4 shows the opposite.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
P r o o fo fP r o p . 3 . 1 . The proof proceeds by showing that when c increases, if Nk
t rises for any
cohort, it rises for the youngest cohorts. Equations (6) and (8) imply that Nk















Note ﬁrst that assumption 1 ensures that the right side is positive. The only term varying with
cohort entry period k is sk
t−1/qk




¢−1 from (1) and sk
t =
qk
t /Qt. Propositions 1.2 and 1.6 imply that qk
t−1 decreases with k: younger cohorts produce less.
Thus sk
t−1/qk
t decreases with k and therefore the right side of (13) also decreases with k. Therefore
inequality (13) is easiest to satisfy for the youngest cohort. The incumbent favoring case, which
requires that entry falls and the number of incumbents rises, is therefore not possible.
P r o o fo fP r o p . 3 . 2 . The proposition is proved by showing that when assumptions 2 and 3
hold, entry must decrease. From the discussion of dp/dφ in the proof of Prop. 2.1 above it can be































t /dp = qk
t + sk
t−1Q0

































The left side is negative because assumption 3 ensures that Qt +Q0
t(pt −c) is positive. Both terms
on the right side are positive, the ﬁrst because the total market share at t−1 of the ﬁrms remaining
i nt h em a r k e ta tt must be less than one and the second because m is convex. Thus (14) is negative
and entry must decrease.
To justify the slope of the price eﬀect in the ﬁgures, we also show here that if Nk
t rises for any
cohort it rises for the oldest cohorts. Under assumption 2, µ0 is constant and the only term in (7)
that varies with k is Ak
t ≡ dV k
t /dP = qk
t + Q0
t(pt − c)sk
t−1 in the price eﬀect. To show that Ak
t






t(pt − c)∆k − ∆kqk
t−1/Qt−1 (16)
where is the ∆k forward diﬀerence operator in k and deﬁnition sk
t = qk
t /Qt is applied. From (1) it
is seen that qk
t−1 =( qk
t − ∆qt)Qt−1/Qt,a n d( 1 6 )i s
−∆kAk
t = −∆kqk
t [1 − εt(pt − c)/pt] (17)
Because −∆kqk
t > 0 (qk
t−1 decreases with k), (17) has the sign of the bracketed term. By assumption
3, Ak
t −Ak+1
t is therefore positive and Ak
t increases with cohort age. Thus if Nk
t rises for any cohort
it is for the oldest cohorts, and the price eﬀect is as pictured in Figures (8)—(9).
A.4 Other results referred to in the text
Lemma 5 When ﬁxed costs rise, the scale of entry ∆qt increases.









Since m is convex and Prop. 2.1 shows that dp/dφ > 0, the scale of entry must increase.
26Lemma 6 When marginal costs rise, entry increases if and only if the scale of entry ∆qt also
increases.
When marginal cost increases, the number of entrants and the scale of entry both move with












and thus ∆qt increases if and only if dpt/dc > 1, which is to say that the margin rises. However,















w h i c hh a st h es i g no fdpt/dc − 1, the same as for (19).
Lemma 7 Assumption 1 is equivalent to assuming that
εt(pt − c)/pt < 1+∆qt/(∆qt + q1
t), (21)
and assumption 3 is stronger than assumption 1.
Since ﬁxed cost is not aﬀected by p,a s s u m p t i o n1i se q u i v a l e n tt oa s s u m i n gt h a tdV k
t /dp > 0
for all t and k ≤ t. Equation (8) implies that dV k











for k<t . The last term can be written ∆qt/(∆qt + qk
t ),w h i c hi ss m a l l e s tf o rk =1 , the oldest
incumbents. If (22) is positive for k =1 , then it is also for all k. Thus assumption 1 is equivalent
to (21). Since the last term in (22) is positive, and assumption 3 involves only the bracketed term
in (22), assumption 3 is stronger than assumption 1.
Lemma 8 When marginal cost rises, exit increases for the oldest cohort.
27Entry of Exit of
Nomenclature New Firms Incumbents
competitor neutral decreases increases
incumbent favoring decreases decreases
entrant favoring increases increases
Table 1: Possible Changes in Entry and Exit in Response to cost increases
From (7) it suﬃces to show that (13) holds with k =1and the direction of the inequality









































The right side is positive as discussed for (15). The second term on the left is negative because m00













¤−1, which varies with k only through qk
t−1.S i n c eqk
t−1 decreases
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Figure 9: Incumbent Favoring Resulting from an Increase in Fixed Cost
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